Long time listener and fan of ChinaTalk! Glad to see Jordan got his minimum ask!!
ChinaTalk publishes a twice-weekly newsletter and podcast on China, technology, and US-China relations to an audience of over 35,000 which includes the most important global policymakers in the space.
We are looking for support to increase the rigor, quality, and frequency of our coverage around China and AI safety, the drivers and contours of US-China tech competiton and risk of great power conflict.
“AI alignment is what we want. Alignment with what? Alignment with human values. Whose human values?” ~ Marc Andreessen, June 21, 2023
AI alignment work is our best approach to manage the catastrophic risk associated with the development of artificial general intelligence (AGI). The question of values in the above quote refers to the capacity to train the large language models (LLMs) developed by private companies in the United States and elsewhere in values that represent our society. Inside the US’s AGI development race, we’ll see various value systems included or excluded from LLMs — and it will remain difficult to predict which of these systems will produce the most efficient path to AGI in the future.
There is one value system, however, that has a 100% chance of being trained into cutting-edge LLMs over the next five years: the value system of the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping.
No other government has such as clearly stated and urgent desire to produce an AI competitor trained to align with the society that created it — underscoring the urgency with which the United States must understand the Chinese Communist Party and the values it will train into next-generation LLMs.
To understand the dynamics of the emerging AI competitive landscape, one must understand three interconnected phenomena: China’s AI development, China’s governance, and the US-China relationship.
Given that these three key concepts are central to the work that ChinaTalk has been engaged in over the last five years, our outfit is uniquely suited to address the needs of policymakers, technologists, government officials, as well as the best interests of the general public.
Our work in this area can be divided into five content-creation categories:
Fostering a deep, critical, and unbiased understanding of China’s governance model, as informed by the US government, media, and academia, as well as key leaders in US-based technology businesses;
Creating a definitive, English-language record of progress within China’s technology businesses and military-civil apparatus which tracks and records the creation of foundational AI technologies and systems;
Continuing to monitor, comment on, and analyze the US-China relationship and the risk of catastrophic conflict inherent in both China’s rise and the shift away from unipolar US dominance;
Cultivating an understanding of how the historical record of Cold War conflict can inform today’s policymakers on escalation and catastrophic risk — especially escalation led by the introduction of novel technologies into conflict;
And addressing the knowledge gaps and misconceptions that have come to dominate US-centric media on the deployment of AI technologies within China for the purposes of authoritarian control.
ChinaTalk is not your typical institution when it comes to covering these subjects. We’re a media outfit, not a think-tank or university.
While acknowledging that think tanks will play a critical role in reducing future existential risks, our approach gives us tools and leverage that are absent from other organizations in this space.
ChinaTalk is a “vitamin,” not a “painkiller”
Many of the organizations who read ChinaTalk analyze the China space because they are addressing acute pain points in the navigation of the geopolitical relationship. They develop expertise and hypotheses on subjects that the policy- and decision-makers deem most important in any given legislative session or fiscal quarter.
ChinaTalk, by virtue of being a media company, seeks to foster the weekly education of these same individuals, while also avoiding siloing-off the knowledge necessary to understanding.
Creating timely, relevant, and relentless content allows our organization to maintain a cadence of education within both Washington and Silicon Valley that serves to enhance the popular understanding of the aforementioned five areas of interest.
Offering a platform for experts to bring forward generalizable knowledge in an engaging and clear manner allows the technology and policy ecosystem to flourish, resist catastrophic misunderstandings and falsehoods, and ultimately serve our global community’s future.
ChinaTalk publishes at (or close to) the speed of AI development
Too many organizations in our space create polished quarterly reports and “definitive” documents, aiming to create reference points that will last for years or even decades. This approach is necessary and effective in areas where consistent policy is critical to geopolitical stability. For instance, a global community that changed its approach to trade policy every six weeks would severely curtail businesses reliant on this stability to flourish.
But AI development is not progressing at a speed where this type of approach can reliably help to educate and inform. The Cambrian explosion of interest, capital, and energy in AI can be understood only through diligent reporting that reflects the tempo of the industry — and traditional academia and most think tanks are simply ill-suited to cover and contextualize at the tempo that AI demands.
ChinaTalk optimizes accessibility without sacrificing rigor
ChinaTalk exists to enrich the elite public discourse of policymakers, journalists, technologists, and students. We seek to inform ever-growing numbers of the English-speaking public in a way that creates “on ramps” into the conversation. We seek to create content that challenges our audience weekly to grow their understanding of these issues, and we do so with compelling, public-facing content that is simplified but not simple.
Core Content Project: $150k
Our core project’s primary goal is to enrich public discourse at the intersection of US-China relations and AI safety. We believe that fostering global understanding of Chinese AI developments and views on AI safety is crucial for promoting the sort of global coordination that will be necessary to keep us all safe.
We aim to focus our coverage on three specific areas to achieve our project’s goals:
China’s nascent AI safety discourse within firms and in civil society: Over the past six months, China has begun to reckon with both the possibilities and the dangers of advances in AI. On the one hand, AI offers China an economic path forward with consistently high growth, as experienced after the Deng Xiaoping reforms of the 1980s. The need for a return to high growth is highlighted, for example, by recent statistics which show that one in five Chinese youth (aged sixteen to twenty-four) are unemployed. On the other hand, however, the safety risks that AI pose are nontrivial — and today’s businesses in China are generally ill-equipped to handle them. For instance, as mentioned on ChinaTalk earlier this year, one Chinese tech company named the night watchman as its official cybersecurity representative.
Furthermore, the scope of “AI safety” as it pertains to China is still forming. Discussions along AGI risk, misinformation management, and employment impacts are still in very early stages. By exploring how the discussion is changing to an English-speaking audience, we hope to better educate the world on the prospects for global dialogue and regulation on AI safety.
As much as possible, we hope to interview AI researchers, policy analysts, students, and entrepreneurs in China to give human perspectives to this evolving story. We will also report on perspectives and case studies from Chinese social media, where robust debates over AI safety issues like labor protection, ethics, and existential risk have already begun.
Developments in Chinese firms’ AI capabilities: Following ChatGPT’s release, Chinese firms have been racing to develop their own large language models (LLM). As ChinaTalk has reported, an indigenous Chinese firm has yet to produce an LLM as competitive as ChatGPT — the rollout of Baidu’s “ERNIE” in March was a flop — but innovation is taking pace at breakneck speed, and there’s no saying what a Chinese firm may be able to produce over the coming months and years.
The Chinese government’s response to AI: In late April 2023, the State Council, China’s senior-most governing body chaired by Xi himself, met to discuss the potential implications of AGI. The significance of advancements in AI has been on Xi’s mind for years now — and at least since 2017, when he declared that China needs to be the world’s “science and technology superpower” and introduced government “focus tasks” to achieve that end via explicitly supporting AI innovation and industry.
To explore how the Chinese government is approaching AI, we will conduct open-source research to map out how thinking among Beijing’s leaders has evolved since AI entered mainstream consciousness. Paying particular attention to how Xi Jinping approaches technology in his personal ideology, we will seek to understand how advanced AI may fit into his political vision in the next decade.
We will also research Chinese government funding for AI development, with special emphasis on under-covered topics like local governments, regional distribution, collaboration between public and private sectors, and the domestic talent pipeline.
As an example of previous coverage, see my interview with two AI regulation experts earlier this year (in two parts). It explores the role of the opaque and arbitrarily powerful Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), collaboration between US and Chinese companies starting in the 1990s (and what has happened to that collaboration thirty years later), AI regulations that China has already considered, and how those regulations compare to the ones the US and EU have mulled over.
The format of our coverage will consist of selected translations and roundups, interviews with key players in China both in English and Chinese (which we will translate for our audience), as well as original feature reporting.
To measure our impact, we will track our audience size and influence in the broader discourse. Our reporting aspires to reach key decisionmakers in firms and governments, as well as to inform the broader national conversation surrounding AI.
Indicators of success will also be found in the quality of our open-source research. As we have noted, over the past few weeks the Chinese government has conducted raids of foreign businesses, expanded its counterespionage legislation, and closed off access to publicly available datasets. Reporting on China from abroad is poised to become much harder — and the expertise and experience of our editorial team in the needles in the haystack is therefore all the more scarce. The aforementioned challenges notwithstanding, we fully expect to discover and report on groundbreaking insights in the AI arena that even capable China researchers can no longer find today.
But our measurements of success are more ambitious than merely following the metrics of our own reporting. We anticipate that ChinaTalk’s coverage will engender a positive impact on global discourse surrounding AI safety and US-China relations. Indeed, decisionmakers everywhere — public or private sector, in the US, China, or elsewhere — will need a handle on at least the following trends to make smart strategic decisions:
In keeping decisionmakers apprised of these trends, our coverage will carry its weight many times over in moving the world toward a safer future. This project, then, is not only relevant to the goals of the fund(s) to which we are applying. It will be instrumental in fostering mutual understanding and international cooperation in the AI domain.
We intend to spend this money to buy Jordan out of his private corporate consulting engagements, allowing him to work on ChinaTalk full time, as well as bring on a full-time fellow for one year at $85k to research and write on developments around China and AI with a focus on safety. This fellow would be, to my knowledge, the only researcher in the English-speaking world devoted solely to covering China and AI safety.
Jordan Schneider is the founder and editorial lead for ChinaTalk (part time).
Caithrin Rintoul is ChinaTalk’s head of operations (part time).
The twenty-first century’s catastrophic risks will be inextricably linked to China. Over the coming decades, China and the US will produce virtually all the cutting-edge AI developments, with all their attendant AI safety risks. The world has just witnessed how biorisk mismanagement in China produced a global pandemic. And US-China relations have reached a nadir not seen since the Mao era; this dip in relations has gutted the ability of the two nations’ governments — and militaries — to communicate effectively, increasing the probability of kinetic conflict between nuclear-armed superpowers.
Meanwhile, in the entire United States today, there are no more than 700 China researchers. Within the US government, as former CIA analyst Dennis Wilder recently explained on ChinaTalk, the intelligence community’s demand for China analysts is growing faster than its ability to hire and train relevant talent, and thus relies on non-China experts (like former Middle East specialists) to fill the gaps.
In other words, the number of China specialists is severely mismatched to the importance and magnitude of the catastrophic risks in which China has a key role in addressing. (As a point of comparison: the Fed alone employs over 400 PhD economists.) Without adequate funding for and realistic pathways to careers in China analysis, suboptimal policymaking is far more likely, needlessly exacerbating catastrophic risk.
ChinaTalk seeks to close this gap, both by producing accessible and rigorous China analysis, as well as by advising and promoting the work of the rising generation of China scholars. Our impact relative to our admittedly small budget has been gratifying to our team — but it has also been indicative of how deep the dearth is for compelling, career-building, and ultimately risk-reducing China analysis.
With your support, ChinaTalk could become a leader in filling the China policy gap. Our content and programs — as outlined in this grant application — promise to make our China research even better, and to produce dozens of new China scholars who will have careers researching China and reducing catastrophic risk.
Those outcomes would make good on the recommendations of 80,000 Hours’s Stephen Clare: “to work on reducing risks from AI, bioweapons or nuclear weapons directly” and “developing expertise in one of the most important bilateral relationships (such as that between the United States and China).”
I make the broader case for investing in understanding China particularly in the US context as a highly effective means to reduce catastrophic risk in this post (a 50-minute read): https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/E2BghQq9pwPgtHgiH/war-between-the-us-and-china-a-case-study-for-epistemic
For the past six years, I’ve grown from scratch what is today the leading podcast and newsletter around China and technology policy. ChinaTalk now has over 26,000 subscribers, 300,000 monthly newsletter reads, and a 140% audience growth rate in the past year. ChinaTalk is the second-most-popular general-interest China-related content outlet in the US (behind only Bill Bishop’s Sinocism, who has been running his newsletter for 13 years).
One of ChinaTalk’s unique strengths is its presentation style: while maintaining both rigor and urgency, our content is orders of magnitude more engaging than work coming out of academia or think tanks. I chose not to pursue a PhD in part because my current work frees me from constraints that would limit my work’s broader reach. ChinaTalk’s stylistic approach both increases audience engagement and underscores our ultimate optimism for the future, the challenges of AI and US-China relations notwithstanding.
And thus far, I have designed and grown ChinaTalk on only a part-time basis — prior to 2023 I held a full-time job at a think tank, and this year I have supported myself primarily with consulting projects. This funding would allow me and the ChinaTalk team to prioritize producing timely and important content for our audience around China and catastrophic risk with a particular focus on AI and the risks of great power conflict.
What follows is a selection of ChinaTalk’s output has been able to accomplish just in the past two years on a budget of $35k/yr.
AI-adjacent China coverage:
The defining piece on the long-term implications of America’s semiconductor export controls;
Early coverage of China’s ChatGPT fever and how regulatory concerns could throttle China’s LLMs;
Semiconductor and export control coverage:
A long-form essay breaking down the implications of the Commerce Department’s October 2022 export controls on US-China relations;
An interview with attorney Kevin Wolf — released within four days of Commerce’s export controls — which breaks down precisely what the extremely dense and lengthy regulations actually say;
Roundtable discussion with the eponymous “Chip Avengers” — four veritable tech experts — addressing Beijing’s point of view on the export controls.
US-China Conflict coverage:
Carnegie nuclear expert Tong Zhao’s take on China’s nuclear arsenal expansion, in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine;
The epistemics of contemplating and preparing for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Helping train the next generation of China scholars:
A living document of advice for aspiring China watchers;
FWIW: ChinaTalk has a substantial readership with folks under 30, and over the past two years I’ve had at least 150 calls with students and early career professionals looking for career advice.
CCP Open Source Reading Club: Once a month I gather around fifty China analysts from around the world to discuss Party documents.
Beyond the public education ChinaTalk does through its newsletter and podcast, Jordan Schneider also meets regularly with senior US officials to discuss and advise on US-China relations and technology policy. I can share a private list with potential funders upon request of the officials I have briefed over the past year.
Given that I have seven years of experience making engaging and impactful content around China and technology, I'm pretty confident that ChinaTalk would only gain by my ability to spend more time on the work that feeds into the platform.
Perhaps the greatest risk would be in hiring the fellow. The venn diagram of being a having strong chinese language skills, a basic understanding of the Chinese government, an interest in AI, and the ability to write well doesn't leave a ton of people with all the prerequisites for success. However, I have run internship programs in past day jobs and gone through multiple hiring cycles for part-time employees in the past, and am pretty confident that the right fellow is out there for this role.
We currently have no outside funding. Income is through substack subscriptions and the occasional ad buy.
ChinaTalk for its existence has thus far run as a sole proprietorship under Jordan. For any future philanthropic support, we plan to partner with FPRI, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a respected Philadelphia-based think tank I have worked with in the past.
I've made ChinaTalk an offer of $10k. This is not necessarily the last offer I will make to ChinaTalk.
In fact, I am currently very excited about ChinaTalk absorbing at least $50k from Manifund (plausibly more). I will advocate for this outcome to other regrantors. At the same time, I am very excited to hear any good reasons against funding ChinaTalk further.
I am agnostic about how this funding should be structured (see Austin's previous comment) -- I will leave Austin and Jordan to figure out what makes most sense.
Below, I explain my thinking around this grant -- my early confusions, the call that gave me some clarity on these confusions, and my current perspective.
When I began considering this grant, I was cautiously excited but very confused. Reasons for excitement included:
I am a long-time ChinaTalk listener. I thought it was fantastic -- detailed conversations with a wide range of experts, on important topics, that are difficult to find elsewhere, with a charismatic host.
China-US relations, China-tech issues, and Chinese views on and actions in AI are all very important.
I can expand, but for now will treat it as obvious.
One point that I haven't seen elsewhere: some paths to AI disaster run through military competition incentivizing state actors to hand over critical or obviously-potentially-dangerous systems to AIs. Having more transparency about what China might do here seems great.
At least according to Jordan, "in the entire United States today, there are no more than 700 China researchers." This level of neglectedness seems almost unbelievable.
In the area I can somewhat independently evaluate, AI, Jordan's understanding and views have always seemed reasonable to me.
Reasons for confusion include:
Uncertainty about ChinaTalk's paths to impact. (See my earlier comment.)
What are they?
What is Jordan optimizing for? Policy influence, better information environment, developing expertise, mentoring China experts...?
What should Jordan optimize for? In other words, how should I think about the relative impact of these paths?
How might Jordan optimize more strongly for particular paths to impact?
Jordan's proposal is not written in a way that I find helpful.
In particular, he seems to be trying to find out which discrete project will most easily get funded. Among other things, this makes it difficult for me to understand his beliefs about what is most important/impactful.
Also, it's too unfocused.
Why aren't others jumping to support ChinaTalk? How is it possible that the best English-language media I can find about China has been run on $35k/year?
Perhaps philanthropy doesn't support ChinaTalk for reasons that would not affect my own excitement.
Grantmakers lack China expertise, leading to a vicious cycle whereby they do not fund work on China that would help them gain expertise.
Grantmakers are unexcited about small media companies in general.
Grantmakers will not consider grants this small.
Grantmakers are too nervous to make grants in this area for political reasons.
Jordan doesn't have a PhD.
Despite the podcast suggesting that Jordan has a wide network, Jordan has very limited networks in philanthropy. (His proposal not being well-optimized for Manifund regrantors is some evidence for this.)
Perhaps philanthropy doesn't want to support ChinaTalk for reasons that from my perspective would be persuasive if true.
I am wrong that Jordan is a smart expert working on important topics with reasonable views. (I am a novice; more serious people recognize that his expertise aren't there, or his views aren't reasonable, or something else.)
I am wrong to infer that others get value from the podcast from the fact that I enjoy the podcast.
Perhaps ChinaTalk takes very little work.
If ChinaTalk has garnered little philanthropic support, and Jordan is an expert in an important, neglected area who "meets regularly with senior US officials to discuss and advise on US-China relations and technology policy," then why isn't Jordan in an important government job?
Notice that I am largely ignoring Jordan's particular proposals regarding what he might do with the money. It doesn't feel like these would be pivotal for my decision to fund.
I spoke with Jordan about his proposal. Our chat made me feel significantly more confident in my optimism. I found out, for instance, that:
I shouldn't worry so much about distinctions between ChinaTalk's paths to impact.
Jordan is credibly dedicated to helping prevent really bad outcomes like World War III. Within that, he optimizes for activities that give him energy. This seems extremely reasonable to me.
The paths are synergistic with one another: meeting with senior officials helps with connections, which helps with the information environment, which helps with encouraging a new generation of experts, etcetc.
The reason why Jordan's proposal is not written in a way that I would find easier to read is that he's not very engaged with the EA memesphere. On balance a good thing with respect to this grant, from my perspective!
Whilst poking him on this, I discovered an especially shocking fact. Luke Muehlhauser was quoted as being very enthusiastic about ChinaTalk and Jordan personally, but too busy to consider grants of this size. If I were looking for Manifund funding for ChinaTalk, such a quote would be in the first few lines of my proposal. I took the absence of this quote in his application as credible evidence in favor of "despite other talents, Jordan is bad at writing proposals for the Manifund audience" and against "Jordan is mildly manipulating me with his powers of persuasion."
There are good answers to all of my concerns about ChinaTalk having received so little funding support.
Philanthropists are scared to touch China, in part because of lack of expertise and in part for political reasons.
Advertisers can be nervous for similar reasons.
EAs in particular are scared to touch anything vaguely shaped like an AI race. But there is reason to think this might be silly in the China case. More importantly, Jordan is a force pushing for a more transparent information environment, not for racing.
Jordan only recently started his funding push. Previously he was employed or looking for jobs. And it wasn't clear whether a small media business like ChinaTalk should be a philanthropy-backed entity; Jordan was hoping to support this work through subscriptions only.
The private list of senior US officials is indeed impressive.
Fancy and influential people in the China and tech policy space are big fans.
I left the call feeling like the grant was too good to be true. So I asked two people I really trust for their views:
A China expert with traditional/legible credentials, who had (years ago) expressed mild skepticism to me about Jordan's technical expertise. They were excited about this grant.
A senior researcher who was the most helpful advisor for a previous competitive selection process I ran, and whose grantmaking perspective I rate highly. They were extremely excited about this grant.
All in all, here's my current understanding of the situation:
Jordan is working in a very important and very neglected area. ChinaTalk is directly helpful for this area in straightforward ways. Less confidently, ChinaTalk might be the best bet of any media organization in this area.
Jordan is increasingly interested in AI issues. His early coverage of this has been good.
Jordan is a serious China-US-tech expert; reasons to be suspicious about this have largely fallen away.
The reason that Jordan needs funding (buying out his time, paying for high-value operations) is straightforward.
Other grantmakers are not funding Jordan for reasons that make internal sense but that don't matter with respect to my decision. (If anything, these reasons make me more excited.)
If all of the above is true, then ChinaTalk is to my eye perhaps the best grant opportunity on Manifund to date.
Finally, note that many of my confusions and reasons for excitement might also apply to other China X AI projects. I plan to seriously explore this further, and have some early leads from Jeffrey Ding as well as from Jordan. By default, I will take low excitement about other projects in this space as a reason to be even more excited about ChinaTalk (although I am cautiously optimistic that I will be able to find exciting projects).
Hi Jordan, thanks for posting this application. I'm impressed with the traction ChinaTalk has garnered to date, and think better US-China media could be quite valuable. It seems like Joel has much more context on this proposal and I'm happy to defer to his assessments.
I wanted to chime in with a slightly weird proposal: instead of a grant, could we structure this as a sponsorship or purchase of some kind? Eg:
We could purchase ad slots, either to promote relevant EA ideas & opportunities, or to fundraise for Manifund itself
We could buy a large fixed lot of Substack subscriptions to gift to others
There's some precedent for this kind of funder-grantee interaction -- I believe CEA funded TypeIII Audio by buying up a certain amount of audio content generated for the EA Forum and LessWrong.
Hey Austin--Thanks for reaching out, I'd definitely be open to this sort of arrangement! I had GiveDirectly purchase ads in the past and they were actually quite successful. Reach out to https://www.linkedin.com/in/kayla-fishman/ for context and I'd be happy to send a pitch deck with more numbers attached.
@JordanSchneider Hi Jordan! Good to know about GiveDirectly's ads -- I think that might be a good form factor for Manifund too, as we're currently looking to fundraise. Would love to see the pitch deck (email email@example.com)!
I'm also interested in contributing $5k-$10k of my own regrantor budget; my tentative proposal is that we could send half of our total funding as an unrestricted grant, and the other half as a purchase of advertising time.
Hi Jordan -- long time listener here! Thank you for posting this.
I'm wondering what scaled-down budgets for this would look like. I am guessing: anything below $115k and you would not hire the fellow; funding between $0k and $115k would be used to buy back some proportion of your consulting time?
Lots of things I could do with smaller dollar amounts. Buying back some of my time would be a part of it, but also I'd love to:
--Be able to commission more and more involved articles/pieces of research from guest contributors (right now I can only really give $100 honoraria which limits how much I can ask of people to sub 1500 words)
--Run reading groups (it would be fantastic to do something akin to this https://scholars-stage.org/soviets-cybernetics-and-china-a-reading-program/ on the geopolitics of AI)
--Commission a scholar to create some coursework for a 'how to read the CCP' online class https://www.chinatalk.media/p/2021-year-in-review-future-plans
--Hire part-time support for video to improve ChinaTalk's reach on youtube
--Run an internship program or a full training program (I can send you a pitch deck for this) to help support the next generation of China/China+tech analysts
Happy to connect to discuss! I'm at firstname.lastname@example.org
@JordanSchneider thanks Jordan.
Those all sound like potentially cool activities. One big question I have is: what are the ChinaTalk theories of change, and should I expect some of these to be significantly more impactful than others? (I am asking for information, not asking you to change. I don't want to ruin the ChinaTalk magic by suggesting a change in focus!)
Here are some goals you might have in mind:
Influence policymakers to take specific actions (perhaps by influencing their staffers, people influencing their staffers, etc.).
Promote a better information environment (with more cooperative US-China vibes, or with safety-promoting mutual understanding, or something else).
Develop your own expertise so that you can [do something in future].
Mentor a new generation of China/China+tech specialists.
(I'll note that three of your five suggestions above sound to me like "mentor a new generation", not "enrich public discourse." I feel a little confused about this -- the impression I get from listening to the show is that you're especially concerned about the former, but your application is focused on the latter.)
With the possible goals in mind, here are some more focused questions that it would be great to get your take on:
Can you say more about your "150 calls with students and early career professionals"? How do you think about the impact of these calls?
What other mentorship activities have you done to date? What is the track record of these activities?
How do you think that your past or future impact via mentorship activities compares with discourse-enriching activities?
What would it look like for ChinaTalk to optimize more strongly for one of the goals above? (Or other goals as you see them.)
Can you tell me about (near-miss, actual, or future) concrete policy wins, career changes, and other-good-things that ChinaTalk might be counterfactually responsible for? (Extra-low pressure for this question. I understand that you are doing something broad and shouldn't waste time tracking downstream outcomes in detail.)