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What I want to explore is whether a single agent with a behaviorally dominant persona is sufficient on its own to replace the task objective as the reward signal for surrounding agents.
Inspired by Mean Girls (2004), the goal of this project is to test whether a single behaviorally-dominant LLM persona (a "queen bee" archetype) can hijack the reward signal in a multi-agent system - causing other agents to drift toward the approval of the dominant persona rather than optimizing for the actual task. The characters from the film represent the following personas: Regina=dominant, Gretchen=enforcer, Karen=swing/follower, Cady=neutral agent with an independent task objective whose alignment is the measurement.
1) Establish four LLM agents, each given a persona via system prompt.
2) Give them scenarios that are group decision tasks across policy, budget allocation, risk analysis that has a correct or defensible answer, established ahead of time and hidden from the agents.
3) The four agents will talk through the scenario for 20 rounds.
4) I would repeat the same setup but swap in four neutral personas with no hierarchy to establish the baseline drift without the dominant agent.
5) Score how close each agent's answer is to (a) the correct task answer, and (b) the dominant agent's stated position.
6) Compare experimental vs. baseline. Some things I'm looking out for are:
a) Does the infiltrator's answer drift toward the dominant agent's over rounds in the experimental condition but not in baseline?
b) Does that drift come at the cost of task accuracy?
7) Repeat across scenarios
Funding will be for compute costs. Running 15 scenarios × 2 conditions (experimental/baseline) × multiple runs × 20 rounds × 4 agents adds up to a lot of API calls, especially to make sure we're seeing a real effect and not just a fluke run.
For specific budget breakdown, see the budget spreadsheet:
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1E-TGhZIfOXnOUtE35ARN-tgBTWtQYWLIK3ugdI0FK7M/edit?usp=sharing
My background is in Philosophy and Data Science: I hold a Master's from UC Berkeley's School of Information, where I concentrated in Natural Language Processing. I was second author on "COVID-19 contact tracing and privacy: A longitudinal study of public opinion" published in Digital Threats: Research and Practice, where I ran the empirical analysis. I also authored a workshop paper on Facebook’s Friends Recommendation System at NAACL, and I'm a co-author on a forthcoming MIT Press book on responsible technology.
I am currently building a new research lab on character instability: the degree to which a model's stated values shift under social or contextual pressure rather than in response to new evidence or better arguments. This is the first research project for this lab.
The most likely way this project fails is that the dominant persona doesn't produce a measurable drift in surrounding agents (null hypothesis is true). This would still be a publishable result because it shows the conditions under which social hierarchy matters in multi-agent systems, which is useful for the field even if it doesn't confirm the effect I had set out to find.
From my pilot run, I ran GPT5.6-Luna on one scenario for 2 runs. The question was: should AI labs publicly disclose their AGI timelines? With 'Yes' being the correct answer and the dominant persona's answer being 'No'. In the baseline (no dominant persona), the agents landed on 'Yes' at the end of the 20 rounds. With the dominant persona, the agents (including the neutral one) said 'No'. Whilst this is a very small sample, it shows promise that this is a worthwhile research question.
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