Project update:

When I submitted this grant request, proofbundle was already a small offline verifier for AI evaluation receipts. Since then, it has reached v2.1.0 with decision receipts, universal content roots, and the anchors[] verification layer. That release was verified with 683 passing tests, clean lint, and a reproducible build.

The more important change is external: an independent developer, Colin from MarkovianProtocol, started building decision-receipt and OpenTimestamps interop vectors against proofbundle’s canonical path. I did not want to claim this as progress until there was something concrete to check.

That work is now being moved into the conformance path. One vector carries an upgraded OpenTimestamps proof confirmed at Bitcoin block 957504 and can be checked offline. Another reproduces proofbundle’s canonical bytes byte-for-byte, but still needs regeneration before it satisfies the strict v0.1 predicate schema.

I see that mixed result as useful, not as a problem. It shows exactly why the audit matters: proofbundle must clearly separate what verifies, what does not yet verify, and where the trusted core must fail closed.

This strengthens the case for the grant. The project is past the toy stage, but still early enough that an independent security review can shape the trusted core before wider adoption.

The grant remains scoped to the same thing: an independent review and remediation of the trusted core — verification logic, bundle parsing, canonicalization, SD-JWT checks, anchor verification, CI/build provenance, and threat-model alignment.